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Social Credits in China: Responses from a Variety of Chinese Citizens about China’s New Data 
Aggregation Initiative 
 In Nineteen Eighty-For, prophesizing a dystopian future replete with mass surveillance, George 
Orwell introduced the concept of Big Brother.1 Today, given technology’s ineluctable advancement, 
governments now have the capability to bring Orwell’s fears to life. In response, countries have 
enacted privacy laws that seek to limit the degree to which governments and corporations may 
aggregate data on their citizens. However, the domestic legislation across countries has been far 
from uniform. On the one hand, the European Union recently enacted sweeping privacy regulations 
that severely restrict the amount of data that countries and corporations may collect and store on 
behalf of their citizens.2 By contrast, in what one may roughly call the “middle ground,” sits the 
United States. There, legislation limits the degree to which the government may aggregate and use 
data, but regulations on data aggregation by private companies are less restrictive.3 Finally, on the far 
other end of this spectrum, sits China. 
 This paper will focus on China’s new data aggregation initiative known as the Social Credit 
System (SCS).4 Essentially, China is in the process of creating a database that attributes a citizenship 
score to all of its citizens. As will be discussed more below, a person’s score will have profound 
                                                 
1 George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-For (Secker & Warburg 1949).  
2 The EU’s new regulation is known as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). It places strict limits 
on when data can be collected and processed. See, for example, Tal Z. Zarsky, Inoompatible: The GDPR in the 
Age of Big Data, 47 Seton Hall L. Rev. 995, 1005 (2017) (“Article 5(1)(b) of the GDPR sets forth the 
fundamental notion that personal data must be collected for a ‘specific, explicit and legitimate’ purpose and 
cannot be further ‘processed’ (a term broadly defined) in a way which is ‘incompatible’ with such original 
purposes.”).  
3 For an overview of US privacy laws, see generally Solove, Daniel J. and Schwartz, Paul M., “An Overview of 
Privacy Law” (October 5, 2015). Chapter 2 of Privacy Law Fundamentals (published by IAPP, 2015); GWU Law 
School Public Law Research Paper No. 2015-45; GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2015-45. Available 
at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2669879. 
4 See Alexandra Ma, China has started ranking citizens with a creepy 'social credit' system — here's what you can do wrong, 
and the embarrassing, demeaning ways they can punish you (Business Insider, April 8, 2018), available at 
http://www.businessinsider.com/china-social-credit-system-punishments-and-rewards-explained-2018-4.  
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consequences on her daily life, including her ability to access credit, rent cars, secure favorable 
housing, etc.  
 This paper will have two main parts. First, I will outline China’s proposed data aggregation 
system. Second, I will discuss the findings of my research that I performed while I was on the 
International Immersion Program’s (IIP) trip to China. While on the IIP trip, we met with a variety 
of Chinese officials, academics, and companies. When possible, I asked a variety of questions related 
to data security and China’s new data aggregation system. The responses I received, while anecdotal, 
demonstrate that there may be a profound difference in how China views the government’s role in 
data aggregation compared to its “Western” counterparts. In general terms, the suspicion regarding 
“Big Brother” that is often articulated in the US and Europe was completely absent whenever I 
inquired about the potential implications of the SCS. Instead, when people were aware of the SCS’s 
existence,5 the responses were uniformly positive. Given that much of my research was anecdotally 
driven, it will not be possible to draw firm conclusions. However, the anecdotes, analyzed 
conjunctively, provide some fascinating insight into Chinese culture and the current and future 
relationship between the Chinese government and its citizens. 
I.  The Social Credit System in China 
 The Social Credit System (SCS) is a massive data aggregation initiative that is tantamount to 
a database that scores people based on their national reputations.6 The system will have a variety of 
                                                 
5 Many people I spoke with were unaware that China is implementing a new data aggregation system. This 
will be discussed more below. However, as a preliminary note, I was quite surprised that people lacked 
awareness of a system that may have profound implications on privacy in China.  
6 Readers who have seen Black Mirror may recall an episode that portrays a future society in which social 
scores are pervasive. In the episode, the scores determine where people can work, live, and the services they 
may access. The genre of the show is science fiction, but the social system used in the episode is markedly 
similar to China’s SCS. In other words, a TV series that highlights the potential dystopian future applications 
of technology will soon become a reality in the most populous country in the world.  
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focuses,7 but the one that was the emphasis of my inquiry while in China assesses “societal 
integrity.”8 It is this aspect of the system that will assign individual citizenship scores to all Chinese 
citizens.  
 To arrive at a score, China’s system will use a variety of inputs. These include consumer 
behavior, social media activity, and real-world occurrences such as speeding tickets and neighborly 
disputes.9 Given the development of surveillance technology,10 the degree to which China’s system 
could incorporate real-world behavior is staggering. Once all of the inputs are aggregated, there will 
likely be some algorithm that uses the inputs to generate an overall citizenship score. Unsurprisingly, 
the precise nature of this algorithm is unclear.  
 The consequences of one’s score will be profound. A score will impact one’s ability to access 
credit, access social services, move, travel, etc.11 Thus, in many ways, a person’s citizenship score will 
determine how “free” he is able to live in Chinese society. Further, as Chinese citizens begin to 
                                                 
7 For example, in addition to rating individual people, the system will also assess “commercial integrity.” 
These ratings will be focused on the corporate level. Thus, it appears as if China’s system will apply to all 
levels of society. Of course, the degree to which all people, regardless of social status, will be assessed equally, 
is far from clear. See Planning Outline for the Construction of a Social Credit System (2014–2020), available at 
https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2014/06/14/planning-outline-for-the-construction-of-a-
social-credit-system-2014-2020/.  
8 See Planning Outline for the Construction of a Social Credit System (2014–2020), available at 
https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2014/06/14/planning-outline-for-the-construction-of-a-
social-credit-system-2014-2020/. 
9 Adam Greenfield, China’s Dystopian Tech Could Be Contagious, The Atlantic (Feb 14, 2018). The potential 
psychological implications of a society that is constantly surveilled are drastic. Indeed, it is unclear if 
meaningful freedom and perpetual surveillance can coexist. This paper, though, will not focus on these 
implications. Instead, it will examine what I gleaned from my conversations with Chinese citizens.  
10 Part of our trip included a visit to Sensetime, a Chinese data company. This company possesses powerful 
technology that enables the seamless, real-time tracking of people and vehicles. More on this will be discussed 
below.  
11 For a list of some of the implications of one’s citizenship score, see Ma, China has started ranking citizens with 
a creepy 'social credit' system — here's what you can do wrong, and the embarrassing, demeaning ways they can punish you 
(cited in note 4).  
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grapple with the reality of living in a society in which they are constantly monitored and assessed, 
there could also be severe psychological consequences.12  
II.  IIP Trip Research Summary 
A. Research Logistics and Caveats 
 As noted above, the research I conducted while on the trip was largely anecdotal. Whenever 
proper, I asked people that we met with for their thoughts on citizenship scores and potential 
implications. I did not have the opportunity to ask meaningful follow-up questions, nor did I have 
the opportunity to pushback on answers that seemed to skirt around the question (this happened a 
few times!). Thus, my research findings are not “generalizable” in the sense that they have not 
undergone a statistical analysis that would enable one to draw broad conclusions from the data. 
However, I did ask a variety of people, across a variety of contexts, about citizenship scores. Thus, 
while anecdotal, my data does offer an interesting cross-section of how a broad array of Chinese 
citizens perceive citizenship scores. At the very least, then, my research provides an interesting 
perspective on how a collection Chinese citizens are making sense of their government’s data 
aggregation initiative. 
 There is another caveat to my research that is centered on the degree to which free 
expression is possible in China. The IIP Trip was sponsored by the China United States Exchange 
Foundation (CUSEF). While the precise source of our trip’s funding is unclear, it is likely that the 
Chinese government sponsored a substantial portion of our trip. Further, on our trip, we were 
                                                 
12 See, for example, Jennifer Golbeck, All Eyes on You (Psychology Today, September 2014), available at 
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/articles/201409/all-eyes-you (“The result [of constant surveillance] 
can be demoralizing and even paranoia-inducing. Lacking the power to control what, when, and with whom 
we share . . . our sense of self may be diminished, leading to self-doubt internally and self-censorship 
externally, as we begin to fixate on what others will think about every potentially public action and thought, 
now and in the future.”).  
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always accompanied by a chaperone that was a representative of the CUSEF. This chaperone 
happened to be a member of China’s communist party with “high up”13 connections. Thus, whether 
our meeting hosts were able to speak candidly is unclear. In all likelihood, though, a stinging critique 
of the SCS would have been unthinkable. Thus, while you are reading my research findings, keep in 
mind that the answers I received may have been quite different had the questions been asked off the 
record (and without a communist party member in the room).  
 Along these lines, there was one conversation at Peking University Law School14 that speaks 
directly to this question. In essence, a student on the IIP Trip asked a law professor about academic 
freedom in China. Specifically, the person asked whether professors could criticize the government, 
and whether the communist party exerted control over intellectual thought.15 The professor 
responded that academics have wide latitude to speak out so long as they are being “helpful.” The 
insinuation was that in the United States, freedom of speech has been coopted by individuals for 
destructive purposes. In other words, the so called unrestrained “marketplace of ideas” gives cover 
to speech that is destructive to society. Thus, to avoid these bad outcomes, China limits its free 
expression to “helpful” speech. While the question of where to draw the line in free expression is 
nuanced and interesting, I do not think limiting speech to what the government considers to be 
“helpful” is consistent with any notion of free expression as that term is understood in the United 
States.  
                                                 
13 This again speaks to the anecdotal nature of my research, but this quote comes from a fellow trip 
participant who was fluent in Chinese and who happened to have a few in-depth conversations with our 
CUSEF chaperone.  
14 Peking University is one of China’s flagship academic institutions.  
15 In one sense, the mere fact that we were able to ask this question speaks to the lack of official censorship 
that occurred during the trip, at least in terms of explicit restraints that were placed on University of Chicago 
students. However, it would not have been possible to ask such a question while we were meeting with 
government officials. When we met with actual government officials, all of our questions were pre-screened, 
and we were not able to ask questions deemed unacceptable.  
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 My takeaway from the professor’s words, then, was that people would likely not feel free to 
criticize the SCS. The SCS is a big initiative, and the Chinese government is undoubtedly aware that 
academics in other countries are looking at it with intense skepticism. Thus, it is unlikely that 
criticism of the SCS would fall into the “helpful” category of speech. In any event, even with this 
caveat in mind, the responses I received while investigating social credits in China still lead to 
interesting conclusions. I will detail the content of these conversations in the next section. 
B. Responses to Questions about Citizenship Scores in China (and other Related Matters) 
 This subsection will detail the responses I received when asking about the SCS while on the 
IIP trip. As noted above, I was unable to ask government officials about the system. Whenever we 
met with the government, all of our questions were pre-screened. Unfortunately, no questions about 
the SCS made the cut.16 However, I did get responses from a variety of academics and officials from 
Chinese companies. Further, there were a few instances in which I (or fellow students) asked 
questions about data security or aggregation more generally without specifically inquiring about the 
SCS or its implications.17 To the extent that these responses were relevant to the focus of my 
research, I have also outlined them below.  
 1. Peking University Law School 
 The first time I was able to ask meaningful questions about the SCS was at Peking University 
Law School. As noted above, Peking University is one of China’s flagship academic institutions. 
                                                 
16 I do not think this is necessarily a red flag. The government agencies we met with were not directly 
involved with designing or implementing the program. However, given that the entire government will be 
using SCS-derived data, there certainly would have been an opportunity for government officials to discuss 
future uses for the SCS had they been willing.  
17 For example, one of the companies we visited was Sensetime. Sensetime specializes in development 
surveillance and tracking technology. While we were visiting the company, I did not have the chance to ask 
directly about how Sensetime’s technology could be used to implement the SCS. However, a co-participant 
did ask about implications for privacy, which I determined was sufficiently relevant to warrant inclusion 
below.  
Barry Frett 
International Immersion Program Working Paper 
While at the university, we met with two law professors, and our questions were not pre-screened at 
all.18 I had the chance to ask about the SCS in China, and my question was as follows: “I recently 
took a class on privacy law while at the University of Chicago. One thing we discussed in class was 
China’s new citizenship score data aggregation system. What do you think are the implications of 
this system on the future of privacy in China?”19 Before I asked the question, I was expecting an 
interesting response. I was thinking that the professors would be eager to demonstrate the merits of 
the SCS to Americans who may be unable to see beyond the perspective of their own privacy 
norms. However, the initial response was blank faces! Neither professor had any idea what I was 
talking about. After thinking for a bit, one of the professors figured out that I was referring to the 
SCS, but the other professor had no idea about the system’s existence. This in and of itself was 
fascinating. It is inconceivable that an analogous situation could unfold in the United States. If the 
United States were contemplating a massive new data aggregation system, would two law professors 
from Harvard, Yale, or Stanford be completely unaware of the system’s existence? It is hard to 
imagine this being the case. 
 Interpreting this ignorance, it is likely indicative of a degree of trust that Chinese citizens 
have in the Chinese government that is completely absent in the United States. I do not think the 
professors feigned ignorance to avoid answering a difficult question, because they both seemed 
genuinely confused when I asked about the SCS. While trust has its merits, it may be dangerous if it 
leads to unawareness of a sweeping data aggregation initiative. As noted above, the SCS could lead 
to the erosion of meaningful freedom in China. If such a system is implemented while many Chinese 
citizens are unaware of its existence, the SCS could become entrenched before people even realize 
                                                 
18 It was here that we heard one professor’s take on free speech in China: people can say what they want 
about the government as long as it is “helpful.” 
19 I asked this question hoping that I would be able to ask a follow-up that addressed Orwellian concerns. 
Unfortunately, the trajectory of the conversation did not allow such a follow-up.  
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what is at stake. Had the Peking University professors been unique, I would feel less confident 
concluding that there is, indeed, systemic unawareness of the SCS. However, these professors would 
prove to be the rule rather than the exception. 
 The initial ignorance aside, one of the professors eventually determined that I was referring 
to the SCS. She then proceeded to explain how the SCS is a valuable tool because it will improve the 
efficiency of local governments. In China, due to its vast geographical size, many governmental 
responsibilities fall to local governments. The professor described the local governments as being 
much less effective than China’s federal government. However, she predicted that the SCS would 
lead to improvements in the ability of local governments to provide services to citizens. Further, she 
also noted that the SCS would be able to reduce the transaction costs of government action across 
all levels of government.  
 The professor did not qualify the merits of the SCS with potential drawbacks. To me, a 
logical question to ask when considering the merits of a new proposal is the cost of achieving those 
benefits. The obvious question, whether sacrificing privacy justifies the reduced transaction costs or 
the increased efficiency of local governments, was never considered. One potentially noteworthy 
factor is that this professor is a member of the communist party. Perhaps her party membership, 
and the need to limit her talk about the government that which is “helpful,” made the professor 
unwilling to discuss the potential downsides of the SCS. 
 On a related note, the professor then discussed privacy in the United States. She attempted 
to portray the SCS as really no different from what private companies in the United States do all the 
time. The only difference is that the government is seeking to use the information to improve 
society and not to sell more consumer goods (which is ostensibly why US companies aggregate 
consumer information). For a variety of reasons, this retort was underwhelming. It is one thing to 
Barry Frett 
International Immersion Program Working Paper 
aggregate information to sell more products, it is another thing entirely to aggregate information to 
give citizens a numerical score that will determine their ability to access services. Further, there is 
also reason to believe that people in the US are less willing to trust private companies when they 
aggregate information on customers in a manner that is systematic, and for uses that can lead to 
substantial consequences. For example, consider credit scores. In response to complaints about how 
companies were using credit scores, the United States implemented the Fair Credit Reporting Act.20 
Thus, the viability of the SCS in China compared to the United States is not as simple as trust being 
placed in the government versus private actors. Rather, it seems that privacy norms in China, 
whether it be government or private actors in play, are simply more relaxed than privacy norms in 
the United States. Or, more cynically, perhaps Chinese citizens such as the professors at Peking 
University do not possess sufficient freedom to assert their privacy interests. 
 Finally, the last part of our conversation about the SCS pertained to its specific contours. 
According to the professor with knowledge of the program, the scope of the SCS is still uncertain. 
However, she did say that there was sufficient pushback to the idea of taxing authorities using SCS 
data to quash that potential application altogether. But yet, if some law professors are totally 
unaware of the SCS’s existence, it is unclear how meaningful the dialogue will be as the Chinese 
government determines the precise applications of the SCS. 
 Overall, my big takeaway from our visit to Peking University is that the SCS is flying 
mysteriously under the radar, to the point where a professor at China’s flagship law school does not 
even know of its existence! Further, either academics lack the freedom to address the negative 
implications of the SCS, or there is genuine faith that the system will work well. If it is the latter, this 
                                                 
20 See, for example, Mark Furletti, An Overview and History of Credit Reporting, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia, June 2002, available at https://www.philadelphiafed.org/-/media/consumer-finance-
institute/payment-cards-center/publications/discussion-papers/2002/CreditReportingHistory_062002.pdf.  
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is indicative of drastically different privacy norms in China compared to elsewhere. Finally, given 
that Peking University professors occupy a privileged position in Chinese society, perhaps the stakes 
of the SCS are lower for university professors than they are for citizens that occupy a lower position 
on the social hierarchy.  
 2. Shenzhen University 
 Shenzhen University is a relatively new academic institution in the city of Shenzhen. 
Shenzhen itself is a new city, and it serves as the de facto capital of China’s technology industry. 
While at the university, the IIP group met with two law professors. I had the chance to ask a few 
questions regarding the role of lawyers in China, and also directly about the SCS. 
 Regarding my SCS-focused questions, I did not receive any responses that indicated 
substantial awareness of the program. However, the lack of a meaningful response may have been 
due to a language barrier rather than avoidance of an uncomfortable question. In any event, given 
the lack of a response to my SCS-themed question, I decided to ask a more general question about 
the role of lawyers in China. Paraphrasing, I asked: “In the United States, lawyers are sometimes 
viewed as necessary because of their ability to fight against government abuse. How does this 
compare to the role of lawyers in China?” 
 A professor proceeded to answer this question in a manner that surprised me. The professor 
did not mention the role of lawyers once. Instead, the professor extolled the virtues of government 
action, and on numerous occasions noted how helpful the government has been in promoting 
China’s economy.21 Further, the professor asserted that competition among cities for business will 
ensure that governments do not exercise excessive power. Seemingly, the thought of critiquing 
                                                 
21 Given that Shenzhen is essentially China’s Silicon Valley, perhaps the salience of government’s 
intertwinement with business was more prominent here. In any event, I was surprised that the answer did not 
address the potential for government overreach at all.  
Barry Frett 
International Immersion Program Working Paper 
China’s federal government, which would be unaffected by the competitive dynamics that 
purportedly mitigate government overreach, was inconceivable. In finishing her answer, the 
professor affirmed that “government is good.” 
 I drew a few conclusions from our session with the law professors at Shenzhen University. 
First, the unawareness of the SCS was not limited to the Peking University professors. Instead, sets 
of law professors from two different Chinese universities had very little knowledge about the 
system. This was a stunning revelation. This would be similar to law professors in the United States 
being unaware of Edward Snowden’s NSA revelations—an inconceivable scenario. Second, the 
willingness of professors in China to critique their government, even hypothetically or incidentally, is 
quite absent. Here, the limitations of anecdotal data are especially prominent. However, for law 
professors at two Chinese universities to have no thoughts regarding negative implications of the 
SCS is telling. At the very least, it seems reasonable to conclude that the Chinese government will 
likely encounter little resistance from academics when they begin to implement the SCS. Perhaps 
resistance would not be compatible with the notion that expression in China is free so long as it is 
“helpful.” 
 3. Sensetime 
 Sensetime is a Chinese company that is currently developing surveillance technology. While 
visiting the company, they were quite upfront about their capabilities: using cameras, the company 
has technology that is able to track the movements of cars and people automatically. They accomplish 
this with cameras that have sensors that are able to read faces and license plates. Further, the 
company representative were also transparent about their close relationship with the Chinese 
government. Indeed, one representative told us that some of their research and development was 
driven by requests from China. Thus, if you couple Sensetime’s technology with omnipresent 
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cameras, one implication is that the Chinese government will have the ability to track and monitor 
its citizens in a seamless manner. This technology could be quite useful as China implements the 
SCS: the Chinese government will have near unlimited access to “real world” behavioral data points 
when calculating citizenship scores. 
 As noted above, Sensetime is aware of China’s interest in their technology. Company 
representatives were transparent about how China actively solicits and implements Sensetime’s 
technology. Further, when discussing their relationship with China, the company officials did not 
attempt to clarify Sensetime’s independence.22 However, we did have the opportunity to ask about 
potential implications of Sensetime’s technology in a breakout session. 
 I was unable to ask a question directly about the SCS, but a co-participant inquired about 
whether Sensetime was worried about uses of their technology that could encroach on privacy 
interests. In response, the company official discussed how Sensetime does not actually use the 
technology themselves. Instead, they are simply developing the technology so that other companies 
or governments may use it. Thus, in other words, even though the question asked about dystopian 
uses of the technology, the answer did not address this concern at all.  
 What is one to make of this non-answer? There are a few possible explanations. One is that 
sinister uses of Sensetime’s technology are simply not on the company’s radar. Coming from a US 
perspective, this is hard to imagine. However, if China indeed has drastically different privacy 
norms, then failing to consider potential applications of the technology is more plausible. Another 
explanation is that Sensetime is aware of how their technology could be used by governments 
                                                 
22 Coming from a US perspective, this was quite odd. Companies that work closely with the government in 
the United States would likely try to distance themselves in some capacity to avoid the perception of being a 
government puppet. However, with Sensetime, this never happened. This could speak to differing norms, or 
could also be indicative of the fact that the Chinese government simply exerts more control over Chinese 
companies given the different system of government.  
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(especially China) to systematically surveil and control citizens, but that the company was told, as 
preparation for our visit, not to discuss such matters. I do not think this explanation is likely. We 
were not asked to provide questions in advance, and given the numerous circumstances in which we 
were required to provide an advanced list of questions (e.g. whenever we met with Chinese 
government officials), it is reasonable to infer that no official censorship was operative here. A final 
explanation is that translational issues prevented the company official from understanding the heart 
of the question. This also seems unlikely given that Sensetime is an international company and is 
therefore required to conduct a lot of business in English.  
 The most reasonable conclusion from our experience with Sensetime, then, is that dystopian 
uses of their technology are not a salient concern. Indeed, much of our conversation was centered 
on how Sensetime’s technology could improve things like social media experiences. This experience, 
combined with some of our prior experiences that I have detailed above, began to paint a picture 
that privacy norms in China are simply different than the norms that I am accustomed to (and 
diametrically opposed to the privacy norms embodied in Europe’s GDPR).23 The notion of differing 
privacy norms would be somewhat confirmed when we had the chance to ask questions to a CUSEF 
leader. 
 4. Discussion with the CUSEF leader.  
 While in Shanghai, we had a dinner with a person who helps run CUSEF. After eating, we 
were given the chance to ask him questions about whatever we wanted. I took this opportunity to 
ask another question about the SCS. 
                                                 
23 It is always worth noting that the other explanation, that Chinese citizens do not feel comfortable 
discussing privacy concerns, could also be an explanatory factor. This discomfort would likely only be 
exacerbated when talking with a group from the United States.  
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 Initially, in line with prior experiences, he did not know what I was talking about. It was not 
until I clarified my question with specifics about the SCS that he realized what I was referring to. As 
noted above, this unawareness of what is seemingly a revolution in social control was striking. 
Addressing the SCS specifically, the CUSEF leader was not concerned at all about the potential for 
abuse. Like the professors from Peking University, he extolled the potential virtues of the system 
(efficiency in local government, reduced transaction costs, etc.) while categorically avoiding potential 
drawbacks. Given that the CUSEF leader almost certainly has an agenda of inculcating a favorable 
image of China, perhaps his avoidance of negative aspects of the SCS is unsurprising. However, the 
explanation may not this simple, especially since this was the unanimous response across a variety of 
contexts whenever I asked about the SCS. 
 The CUSEF leader’s next part of his answer shed some light on the notion of differing 
privacy norms. Perhaps in response to a bemused look on my face, he went on to explicitly detail 
how privacy norms in China, especially regarding the trust citizens place in the government, are 
fundamentally different from what we experience in the West. In the West, the social contract 
theory is embedded in our notion of government. Speaking generally, we give some of our freedom 
to the government in exchange for stability, but we are generally skeptical of government overreach. 
No such notion is embedded in the framework of Chinese society. Thus, according to the CUSEF 
leader, initiatives like the SCS are simply met with less skepticism than they would be if they were 
introduced elsewhere.  
III. CONCLUSION 
 The results of my research, while anecdotal, are telling. Across the board, the people I spoke 
with were either unaware of the SCS, or entirely unbothered by its potential privacy implications. 
The fact that this mindset extended to professors at China’s premier law school is worrisome. 
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Indeed, one would expect that legal scholars would be the group most aware of the SCS, and the 
group best positioned to mitigate some of its negative consequences. And yet, this was not the case. 
Thus, it appears as if the SCS will proceed in China without any meaningful oversight or pushback 
from people outside of the government. If history is any indicator, such concentrated power, and 
lack of outside oversight, could be dangerous for Chinese citizens. As 2020 inches nearer, and the 
SCS gets closer to complete implementation, it will be interesting to see how the people of China 
receive the new program. But, given the unanimously optimistic outlook that people who were 
aware of the SCS embodied, perhaps the dystopian future that I am envisioning will not materialize.  
 In terms of overall takeaways from my experience in China, there are a few. First, Chinese 
citizens trust their government a lot more than American citizens do. Whether this trust is sincere, 
or the result of coercion, is unclear. Further, it is also unclear whether this mindset would be shared 
by Chinese citizens who occupy lower positions on the social hierarchy. Indeed, all of the people we 
met with held positions of privilege. Perhaps it is easy to trust the government when that trust has 
led to a prosperous life. However, it is safe to say that elites in the United States would certainly be 
distrustful of a surveillance overhaul like the SCS. Thus, even given these caveats, it is reasonable to 
conclude that people in China are less skeptical of their government than people in the United 
States.  
 Second, the notion of individualized privacy was absent. Whenever I asked about the 
negative privacy implications of the SCS, I received answers that completely failed to address the 
question. Further, when we visited Sensetime, the company representatives were gleeful as they 
demonstrated how their technology could track an individual person from his house, to work, and 
back to his house, in an entirely automatic fashion. And, when we asked follow-up questions that 
were critical of the implications of such technology, the only response we received was excitement 
about social media applications. It is inconceivable that an American company would display such 
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technology without at least paying lip service to how they are attempting to mitigate potential 
abuses.  
 In sum, my research in China revealed three main findings.24 First, people are either unaware 
of the SCS, or optimistic about its ability to enhance government efficiency. Second, distrust of the 
government is much less pronounced in China, at least among elites. And finally, the notion of 
individualized privacy is seemingly unimportant. Analyzing these main findings conjunctively, it is 
unclear where the resistance to the SCS will come from if it does devolve into a totalitarian device 
for social control. In any event, as China begins to fully implement the SCS, it will be fascinating to 
watch how the situation unfolds.    
  
 
  
  
  
                                                 
24 Again, given the anecdotal nature of my research, I do not pretend that these findings are scientifically 
generalizable. However, I did ask questions to a wide array of people, and the answers were essentially 
unanimous. Thus, to some extent, my research findings may be indicative of general trends in Chinese 
society.  
